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Saturday Review,10 challenges Snow's interpretation of the qualities and contri-
butions of the two British scientists, and the debate over the validity of the
cautionary tale is continued in a subsequent issue of the magazine."' Con-
ceivably, these assorted adjustments, not wholly devoid of subtlety, will con-
jure the world that Snow professes to see out of existence.
But I doubt it.
MERLE KLINGt
THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION. By Louis Eisenstein. New York: Ronald
Press, 1961. Pp. 263. $5.00.
THOSE who have been fascinated or intrigued by the writings of Thurman
Arnold during the past several decades should welcome this book about federal
taxation by Louis Eisenstein. It is of the same genre as the works of Arnold.
Thus, in broad terms, it charges that most discussions about the policies of
federal taxation are "ideologies" designed to conceal from public view the
"real issues" and, by implication at least, that only a chosen few fully under-
stand this and are aware of these issues. As Arnold in The Folklore of Capital-
ism explained how "creeds" and "ideals" of institutions are shaped and in-
fluenced by social "needs," so Eisenstein in his book traces out how the
"ideologies" of taxation serve the practical needs of those who hold them.
In the early part of his book Eisenstein appears to speak forthrightly about
the nature of these practical needs. "Our taxes," he says, "reflect a continuing
struggle among contending interests for the privilege of paying the least."'
Only a few sentences later he seems to plunge more deeply into that eternally
beguiling sea which is cynicism when he says, "Tax legislation commonly de-
rives from private pressures exerted for selfish ends." 2 Those with common
economic concerns become "groups" and "interests" (terms which the author
regards as less candid but more flexible and versatile than such old-fashioned
designations as "factions" or "classes") which seek to have the tax law serve
their "fiscal aspirations."3 To achieve this end it is necessary for these groups
to develop theories which will convince others that the group's "fiscal aspira-
tions" serve the needs of all. These theories become ideologies which to be
effective must not only serve selfish ends but also, asserts Eisenstein in his
tough-minded way, "convey a vital sense of some immutable principle that
rises majestically above partisan preferences." 4 Thus, it seems fair to say that
10. March 4, 1961, p. 49.
11. April 1, 1961, p. 4 5 .
tProfessor of Political Science, Washington University (St. Louis).






the author appears to regard ideologies as instruments of political warfare
fashioned to deceive opposing groups and interests and to win battles.
As Eisenstein sees it there are three primary ideologies in the area of
federal taxation-that of ability to pay, barriers and deterrents, and equity.
The first holds that a just tax is one based upon ability to pay, this being
properly determined by reference to the entire income of the taxpayer irrespec-
tive of its source, and assessed at progressive rates. The second states that the
survival of our form of capitalism depends upon a structure and rate of taxa-
tion which do not destroy either the incentive to work and invest or the
sources of new capital. The third is that those who are similarly situated should
be similarly taxed and its corollary that those who are dissimilarly situated
should not be similarly taxed. This book asserts, with biting wit and a keen
sense of irony, that many who hold these ideologies use them either timidly to
conceal some "disreputable" thoughts or crudely to justify patently selfish
ends, that the ideology of barriers and deterrents is not supported by the facts,
and that the ideology of equity serves to obscure the essential problem which is
whether the distinctions made by the tax law between taxpayers reflect "a
difference in circumstances which justifies a difference in treatment." 5
The charge of timid concealment is primarily directed at the adherents of
the ideology of ability to pay with whom Eisenstein has substantial sympathy.
He points out that these ideologists, although deeply committed to the belief
that a progressive income, estate and gift tax is necessary to reduce economic
inequality, nonetheless frequently assert that their views spring instead from a
desire to be neutral as between competing groups and interests. In addition, he
observes that when Congress has departed from the course marked out by the
ideology of ability to pay at least some of these departures have been approved by
the most doctrinaire of these ideologists. To Eisenstein the explanation for this
lack of candor and grudging, sometimes almost covert, approval of congres-
sional departures is, first, the emotional comfort which the ideology provides to
its adherents and, second, the fear that explicit recognition of the purpose of
progressive taxation will lead to a rejection of this end by the people. This
reason does not persuade Eisenstein. He admonishes these ideologists to assert
openly their goal of reduced inequality and to "do battle on the questions of
policy" 6 which arise when Congress is requested to alter the meaning of ability
to pay because of such circumstances as the inability to earn more income,7 the
martital status of the income recipient,8 the variations in the cost of living of
taxpayers who receive equal incomes,0 the need to save to provide for future
5. P. 160.
6. P.56.
7. This was the circumstance which helped produce the additional $600 exemption for
those over 65 and certain provisions of the retirement income credit. Pp. 38-40.
8. This is reflected in the income splitting provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948. P. 43.
9. Eisenstein suggests this as a possible justification for the special exemption for
the blind and the deduction for working wives and widowers for expenses incurred in the
care of children under 12. P. 42.
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needs,10 the social desirability of certain expenditures of the taxpayer," and the
form in which the income producing activity is conducted.12
To me it is apparent that there is both some truth in this analysis and
wisdom in the admonition. However, this book does less justice to these
ideologists of ability to pay than they deserve. Particularly is this true of
Surrey and Cary, two who receive fairly harsh treatment in this volume. My
understanding of these ideologists is that they want an estate, gift and income
tax which primarily pursues the goal of reduced inequality through rate
progression and which is not encumbered by a host of provisions designed to
meliorate the economic and social position of many diversely situated tax-
payers. To them taxable income should be, roughly speaking, economic gains
reduced by the expenses more or less directly incurred in the process of their
realization. They do not object to the pursuit by government of social and
economic goals of many sorts; they simply prefer that these be accomplished by
means other than the tax laws.
Nonetheless, it is proper to ask these ideologists of abiltiy to state the
reasons for this preference. While Eisenstein does not put the question directly,
his insistence that they justify departures from their creed '3 plainly requires
a statement of these reasons. This is a significant accomplishment because such
ideologists often appear to view their preference as expressing a self-evident
proposition. In fact it is by no means clear that Congress should be asked
to forego the use of tax law in its day to day business of responding to the
wants of the people. Because I believe that institutions, including the tax law,
have their effectiveness diminished by what can be called a "purposive over-
load" and that it is possible to develop a climate of opinion which recognizes
this, I share the preference of the ideologists of ability to pay. Eisenstein, how-
ever, is quite right in putting us on the defensive.
Having put us there by his challenge to "do battle on the questions of
policy,"'14 he should offer assistance in this task. This he does not do. Perhaps
he does not because he believes his assertion that tax legislation only derives
from private pressures exerted for selfish ends. So viewed, tax policy is simply
another name for cant and rhetoric. But in that event why the challenge, and if
policy is but the clothing of selfishness, what can be gained by its examination?
This raises the issue which haunted me as I read this book. Is Eisenstein,
whom I have never met, an adventurer without scruples engaged in fashioning
his own ideological weapons to vanquish those who stand in his way, or is he a
social reformer filled with righteous indignation writing this book to promote
his view of the good life?
10. This possibly would justify an earned income credit. P. 49.
11. Charitable gifts are deductible because of this circumstance.
12. The corporation can be an effective means o avoidance of the full impact of pro-





Believing as I do that Edmund N. Calm was right when he said, "Justice
and power... are both deeply real to law, and both are finite,"15 and that the
will of the stronger is not the ultimate reality of society, it is impossible for me
to escape the feeling that Eisenstein is essentially a social reformer. And I
believe further that, if I am right about this, he does himself a grave injustice
in emphasizing so heavily selfishness of political power. Had he described his
view of the good life, those of us challenged to consider policy issues would have
been able to draw him into the discussion. As it is, he sits apart, describes the
ways of tax ideologists with cynical detachment, and concludes the volume
with the observation that improvement of the tax law depends upon the election
of Congressmen who will not yield to the wrong people. 16
This estimate of Eisenstein's objectives was not reached without difficulty.
How, my thoughts ran, can one who regards selfishness as the quintessence of
tax law regard human society in a significantly different way? And if society
is so viewed, is there any basis for assuming that the viewer can be seriously
interested in social reforms except insofar as they result in selfish gain? Be-
cause these questions deeply troubled me I drew much comfort from the
instances in this book where the many layers of urbane wit, sophistication,
wryness and general disenchantment are worn thin and through which I think
one can glimpse the outlines of a writer earnestly concerned with moral
problems.
One such instance occurs in an entertaining chapter entitled, "What Is a
Loophole?" Eisenstein repeats an often made observation that a "loophole"
is a tax provision favorable to another which one does not like. However, al-
though he cites the view of Dickens' character from A Tale of Two Cities,
Jerry Cruncher, who describes his work of removing bodies from graves as
that of "a Resurrection-Man," as a satisfactory guide to the ethics behind the
"loophole" characterization, he introduces a better standard when he says,
"In short, whether a dispensation is a loophole depends on the guiding con-
cept of right and wrong.'1 7 And again when he says, "We cannot learn very
much by asking what is a loophole. The meaningful questions are those which
focus on the precise purposes and effects of a dispensation. Of course, the
answers will vary, for they will reflect different standards of good and evil."' 8
Another instance which afforded a rather good view of the reformer be-
hind the facade which this book carefully constructs occurs when the ideology
of barriers and deterrents is discussed. It is obvious that here is an area which
elicits a treatment by Eisenstein which is mixed with anger and passion. Those
who employ this ideology (most of whom, although not all, are Republicans)
are, he feels, rather nasty people who know not the truth. Although their
ideology has not failed to achieve tax reduction, this does not, as one might ex-
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pect, entitle them to Eisenstein's praise. His purpose is to discredit them
publicly because, I submit, their view of a good society does not accord with
his.
He sets about his task by describing the ideologists of barriers and deterrents
as a gloomy lot who are not above predicting the downfall of the nation if
their taxes are not reduced. They chant that in the absence of such reduction
the incentives to work and invest will be substantially undermined and the
supply of venture capital will be dangerously diminished. In response the
author observes acidly that despite today's high taxes our system is functioning
better than ever. We are richer and taxes are higher than thirty years ago.
Such facts, he asserts, expose the ideology as a false dogma used by the rich to
reduce their taxes.
These are the harsh words of one who is engaged in advancing a cause about
which he feels strongly. So intense is his feeling that he cannot refrain from
slanting his material in rather obvious ways. For example, to refute the charge
that high taxes impair the will to work the study by Sanders 10 is cited. This
is proper because it was Sanders' conclusion that executives had not ceased to
work arduously and conscientiously even though taxes were quite high.
Nonetheless, Sanders' study contains a qualification which is not adequately
dealt with by Eisenstein. After stating his conclusion, Sanders observed: "This
does not mean, however, that they are working as effectively as ever. Higher
taxes are only one segment of a general enlargement of the impact of govern-
ment on business, the broad result of which is to divert a substantial fraction of
executive energies and abilities into channels other than those which may be
called 'productive' in the strict economic sense of the word. ' 20 This diversion
of effort which is a part of any large revenue-producing tax system is further
underscored by Sanders in his discussion of pension plans and the investments
of executives. Eisenstein does not note this qualification nor does he deal with
the problem.
Again he slants his material when he refers to Hall's study 21 to support the
view that executive exertions are not abated by high taxes. He omits a con-
clusion which Hall states with firmness: "High progressive personal income
taxation of executives, in the opinion of the writer, reduces the output of goods
and services. Although partially offset by an increase in the years of active
employment, the dominant effect arises from the indirect reduction in efforts of
executives and their impaired allocation among different companies."'22
But he does not altogether ignore this conclusion of Hall. A page or two
19. SANDERS, EFFEcrs OF TAXATION ON EXECUTIVES (1951).
20. Id. at 76-77.
21. HALL, EFFECTS OF TAXATION: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND REIMENT PLANS
(1951).
22. Id. at 279-80. The "indirect reduction in efforts" results from deferred retirements.
Hall also concludes that deferred compensation plans reduce the output of goods and services
while retirement plans increase such output.
[Vol.71:182
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later he speculates, "Let us suppose, however, that Professors Sanders and Hall
are too optimistic; that some executives have failed to adjust themselves to
high rates and are disturbed by a tax neurosis." 23 He then observes in tones
distinctly out of harmony with the current fascination of the Democratic Party
with economic growth and investment incentives that tax induced leisure may
not be a bad thing. Again, he acknowledges a few sentences later that a diver-
sion of talent from business to other fields may be quite desirable. Nowhere,
however, does he grapple seriously with the qualifications which appear in
the studies of Sanders and Hall. More important, Eisenstein seems unaware
of the possible consequences of the ethos surrounding the federal tax system to
wbat Max Weber called the spirit of capitalism.2 4 That such consequences
exist is reasonably certain (for example, deductibility is a better argument for
spending than Franklin's views on thrift are for saving), and it would be
even more certain were the ethos of taxation as Eisenstein describes it. In the
long run these consequences will be the most lasting accomplishment of our tax
system.
Another instance of slanting occurs in the treatment of investment incentives
and the system of taxing capital gains. Eisenstein makes his refutation of what
he calls "the dogma of diminishing risk," the view that present tax rates reduce
the incentive to take business risks, by standing on the well known study of the
problem by Butters, Thompson and Bollinger.25 His interpretation of this
study can be presented fairly by quoting three sentences:
The combined effect, then, of the ordinary rates and the capital gain
rate is to reinforce the individual traits of investors. The security-
minded become more cautious and the risk-minded more daring . . .
"The tax incentives operate in both directions, and it may well be that
those tending to channel funds to new ventures actually outweigh
in significance those tending to divert funds from such investments." 2
This is a reasonably accurate description although I have set out in the foot-
note a "one-paragraph distillation" prepared by the authors of the study which
is more qualified.2 7 The point to note is that Eisenstein appears to acknowledge
23. P. 73.
24. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (student ed.
1958).
25. BUTTERS, THoMPS N & BOLLINGER, EFFECTS OF TAXATION: INVESTMENTS BY
INDIVIDUALS (1951).
26. Pp. 78-79. The last sentence of this quotation is itself a quotation from the Butters,
Thompson and Bollinger study.
27. This appears in Chapter II, a chapter summarizing the factual findings, of the
Butters, Thompson and Bollinger study, op. cit. supra note 25, at 50-51:
With all the above factors taken into account, the following is the best one-paragraph
distillation of our findings that we can give. The tax structure, as of 1949, cut
substantially into the investment capacity of the upper income and wealth classes-
the strategic source of venture capital for investment in business-and, on balance,
it also decreased the willingness of these investors in the aggregate to make equity-
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that capital gains taxation affects the incentive to invest. Accordingly, he
should deal with the problem when his case for the abolition of the special rate
for capital gains is made some fifteen or twenty pages later. This he does not
do. Ignored is the following passage from the Butters, Thompson and Bollin-
ger study:
In other words, if the existing balance in investment incentives is to be
maintained, any increases in capital gains taxation would need to be
offset by compensating in the rates at which ordinary income is taxed
and preferably also by a reduction or elimination of the existing oppor-
tunities for obtaining tax-exempt income from relatively riskless invest-
ments.
28
In fact, he asserts that the "dispensation for capital gains is [not] a sensitive
reaction to high rates." 29 Perhaps not, but there is presently a relationship
between them which should be considered if the Butters, Thompson and
Bollinger study is accepted.
This study is again used in a somewhat misleading fashion when Eisenstein
considers "the dogma of inadequate savings,"3 the view that high taxes are
destroying the sources of venture capital. It is cited for the proposition that the
role of individual investors as a source of venture capital has been "greatly
exaggerated." 3' 1 The report does say this but continues in this fashion:
The future of the free enterprise system, it is often implied, depends
mainly-almost exclusively--on the continued ability and willingness
of individuals with large incomes to provide the venture capital and
equity funds needed to finance business growth. It is not our intention
to minimize the strategic role played in our economic system by this
source of funds-as will be abundantly clear fron the following dis-
Cussion.32
type investments. In other words, for equity-type investments considered as a whole
the investors who were induced by taxes to shift to less risky investment positions
appear to have overbalanced the opposite reaction of appreciation-minded investors.
The latter group, however, may have been so stimulated by the tax structure to seek
out investments offering unusually large capital gains potentialities, such as promising
new ventures, as actually to increase the flow of capital to such situations. However
this may be, it is clear that the combined impact of these effects fell short of drying up
the supply of equity capital which private investors were willing and able to make
available to business. The evidence indicates that the accumulation of investable
funds by the upper income classes has been consistently large during the postwar
years, despite the existing tax structure, and that individuals with large incomes
and substantial wealth continue as a group to hold and invest a large proportion of
their funds in equity-type investments...
28. This appears in a discussion of the major policy implications of the Butters,




32. BUTTERS, THo PsON & BOLLINGER, Op. cit. supra note 25, at 3 (emphasis added).
[Vol.71:182
REVIEWS
There are other complex problems overlooked by Eisenstein in his passion-
ate dislike of those who hold the ideology of barriers and deterrents. For ex-
ample, although he recognizes that the taxation of capital gains at a special
rate has economic consequences, he fails to discuss the consequences which
might result from the taxation of all gains at the applicable ordinary income
rates. These consequences, which could include some diminution in reliance
upon retained earnings as a source of investment funds and perhaps some de-
cline in the search for "growth situations," suggest, as Walter Blum has put it,
"that the capital gains issue is knotty."3 3 Similarly, Eisenstein points out
correctly that operation of the dividend-received credit reduces the over-
taxation of dividends received by the right to a greater extent than it does
those received by the poor. In so doing, however, he neglects to emphasize that
overta-xation of corporate earnings, as well as undertaxation, exists to some
extent, provided certain assumptions are made regarding the incidence of the
tax on corporate income and the notion that equal incomes should be taxed
equally irrespective of their source is accepted.34
It must be acknowledged that Eisenstein more resembles the nihilist 36 than
the social reformer promoting the good life when he discusses the ideology of
equity. In his view, it has become an ideology in support of tax reduction be-
cause those who wish to be treated favorably emphasize their dissimilarity
from all others and those who seek the favorable treatment already accorded to
others emphasize their similarity to such others. No one can deny that the
principle of equity is often used in this fashion and he mentions many well
known instances of it. What will trouble the reader is that practically nothing is
done to demonstrate that the guide of equity has often been used in the tax
law to prevent tax reduction as well as to eliminate unusually harsh treatment.
This astonishingly one-sided treatment of the ideology of equity becomes even
less pardonable when the author concludes by suggesting that one should
take to heart Edmund Cahn's observation that "those only are equal whom the
law has elected to equalize. '36 This does not sound like the Cahn quoted earlier,
and indeed it is not. The more contextually accurate quotation is as follows:
Now equality is in general the creature of positive law. Courts and
legislatures establish classes of humanity, categorizing for one or an-
other purpose the duties and rights they desire to effect, to destroy, or
to qualify. Thus, before a court, those only are equal whom the law has
elected to equalize. The point is that the inequalities resulting from the
33. Blum, A Handy Sumnmry of the Capital Gains Argument, 35 TAxzs 247, 266
(1957).
34. See Holland, Stockholder Differential Taxation and Tax Relief, Tax Revision
Compendium, HoUsE Comm. oN WAYS AND MEANs, 86TH CONG., IsT SEss. vol. 3, at 1551
(1959).
35. Gilmore recently drew attention to the fact that one of the strands of legal realism,
i.e. the attack on conceptualism, sometimes "degenerated into a childish nihilism." Gilmore,
Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1961).
36. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 14 (1949).
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law must make sense. If decisions differ, some discernible distinction
must be found bearing an intelligent relation to the difference in result.
The sense of injustice revolts against whatever is unequal by caprice.
The arbitrary, although indispensable to many of law's daily operations,
is always suspect, it becomes unjust when it discriminates between
indistinguishables. 37
Nonetheless I am prepared to stand by my judgment that Eisenstein is a
deeply moral man striking out in fury with the weapon of mockery. Viewed
from my perspective his book is seriously defective, however, because his
view of the good life is never adequately revealed. This failure I suspect is the
result of too close adherence to the axioms of that old warrior whose spirit
stalks the pages of this book-Thurman Arnold. Many years ago he said,
"Public debate is necessarily only a method of giving unity and morale to
organizations. It is ceremonial and designed to create enthusiasm, to increase
faith and quiet doubt. It can have nothing to do with the actual practical
analysis of facts." 38 It is too bad that Eisenstein half believes this.
JOSEPii TYREE SNEEDt
37. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
38. ARNOLD, TilE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISm 379 (1937).
tProfessor of Law, Cornell University. Visiting Professor of Law, Yale University,
1960-1961.
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